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Introduction
One of the main goals of most governments and international agencies is to improve the quality of education. This task has proven to be elusive. Evidence shows that increasing resources alone is not enough to improve outcomes (Patrinos, 2007) . How resources are used is key to their effectiveness in achieving student learning (Vegas and Umansky, 2005; Galiani and Pérez-Truglia, 2014) . How resources are used depends on the nature of the resources, the incentives provided to the agents who use them, and the institutional setting. One current policy that aims to improve the use of resources by changing how resources are used is school-based management (SBM).
SBM programs transfer resources directly to schools and require parental involvement in resource allocation. The rationale behind SBM design is that parents can allocate resources more effectively than a centralized decision maker because they have the incentive to improve student learning, can better observe specific local school needs, and can better monitor the proper use of funds. This paper explores the assumption that parents have the incentive to improve student learning through an efficient allocation of resources within the school.
Parents may have other competing needs outside the school, such as food, clothing, and housing. Parents may not allocate resources efficiently when only school outcomes are considered. Specifically, this study explores whether parents change voluntary contributions when the school receives additional funding over which they have decision-making power. program evaluation of transfers to school constituents may understate the benefits of a given program when resources are allocated outside of the school. Program evaluation should try to assess the benefits derived from resources used outside of the school. Third, the Mexican experience may provide some insights into how SBM programs work in a developing country context. This is relevant because other countries are implementing and operating similar programs (Skoufias and Shapiro, 2006) . By 2007, SBM had been introduced in over one-third of primary schools in Mexico and it had been implemented in over 20 countries. This paper makes three main contributions. First, it proposes a theoretical model to analyze the path through which the design of external transfers to schools mediate direct and indirect effects of SBM programs. Second, it provides empirical evidence that parents change the amount of their voluntary contributions when they receive external funding. These reactions are different depending on how the transfer is made and on household income. Third, it contributes to the literature that aims to explore the channels through which investment in education leads to heterogeneous findings in student outcomes.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a literature review.
Section 3 presents a simple model to discuss the theoretical prediction of the average effect of SBM on voluntary contributions. Section 4 explains the PEC and AGEs programs and how they were implemented. Sections 5 and 6 describe the data and estimation methods, respectively. Section 7 presents the impact of the programs on voluntary contributions. Section 8 concludes.
Literature Review
This section provides an overview of the literature on the effects of external investment on the behavior of school constituents and on student learning. The way in which external resources impact student learning can be thought of as a two-step process. In a first step, those who make decisions about resource allocation receive funds and adjust 5 their behavior within a given institutional framework. This change in behavior may introduce changes both in inputs toward which the resources are aimed (direct effect) and in other uses (indirect effect). Glewwe and Kremer (2006) , Behrman and King (2001), and Bando (2013) state the importance of acknowledging both the direct and the indirect effects of resource provision on education outcomes and the role of other factors affecting decision-making in mediating the choices. Houtenville and Conway (2008) find a negative correlation between school resources and parental effort, and Liu et al. (2010) find that an improvement in school quality leads to increased labor supply by mothers.
Other agents that change include teachers. For example, Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2013) and Duflo, Dupas, and Kremer (2012) find that the provision of extra teachers decreases teacher effort.
In a second step, the shock in inputs leads to changes in test scores. Das et al. (2013) and Pop-Eleches and Urquiola (2013) explore how key decision makers mediate resource allocation and its subsequent effects on student learning. Das et al. (2013) find that unanticipated grants to schools lead to an increase in inputs available within the school and student learning but that anticipated grants lead to parental substitution of resources and no changes in school inputs or student learning. Pop-Eleches and Urquiola (2013) find that when children are able to enroll in a better school, parents reduce effort but the overall effect is positive.
The literature on the effects of changes in inputs on student learning without a focus on direct and indirect effects is extensive. For example, Kremer (2003), Vegas and Umansky (2005) , Bando (2013) , and Glewwe et al. (2011) review the available evidence and conclude that there is heterogeneity of effects for a given input and that how inputs are provided seems to matter more than their amount.
Literature specific to SBM mostly focuses on direct effects. Barrera et al. (2009) describe the SBM model in detail and review the evidence. SBM reduces failure rates, reduces grade repetition, and reduces dropout rates. The effects of SBM on student learning are not always consistent. The authors propose several sources of heterogeneity on program impacts, such as differences in the nature of the interventions, program maturity, and differential use of impact estimation techniques. There are a limited 6 number of quantitative studies that provide evidence of possible indirect effects.
Umansky and Vegas (2007) provide evidence that school based management reforms in Central America resulted in changes in management and teacher characteristics.
More work remains to better understand what changes are detonated by SBM in the school community and how this affects student learning.
Conceptual Framework
This section proposes a model of how parents determine how much to invest in transfers to the school. This model is relevant in contexts where voluntary contributions of parents cover recurrent costs given limited transfers of public funds to the school, such as in the case of public schools in Mexico. In the model, parents maximize lifetime utility, which is a function of consumption and accumulated human capital. The optimal allocation of resources is such that the relative marginal return on human capital production equals the relative marginal return on consumption.
Assuming decreasing rates of return, the model predicts that a cash transfer should lead to a reduction in voluntary contributions made by parents, while a matching scheme should lead to an increase.
Household Decisions on Human Capital Investment
Let the parents' association be a group of households represented by one parent each that meet and vote to set a common voluntary contribution for their children's school the following school year. According to the median voter theorem, if household preferences can be represented as a point along a single dimension, if they vote deterministically for the motion closest to their own preference, and if there are only two motions, then the winning motion will be the one preferred by the median household. The model focuses on the behavior for the median household and thus the choices made by the parents' association. Changes that could possibly take place within the organization of the parents' association and potential influences in decision 7 making are not taken into account. The assumptions of the median voter theorem are assumed to hold; more detailed decision making in the school is a subject for future research.
Setup
Simplifying the model by Glewwe and Jacoby (2004) , consider a household that lives two periods with school-age children. The household is endowed with resources Y ≥ 0 at time zero. In this period, parents allocate resources either to current consumption C or to investment in human capital accumulation as voluntary contributions M. Children go to school in the first period. The household only benefits from returns on education after the schooling period is over at time one.
The accumulation of human capital depends on the school production function.
Schools require each of the n students enrolled to pay the same fee; therefore, human capital accumulation is a function of the total resources available to the school nM.
Schools receive external transfers in a combination of a cash grant B and γ for each dollar of private transfers. In this case, the total income available to the school will accrue to n(1 + γ)M + B. Let the human capital accumulation function be given by
where the function G is a neoclassical human capital production function with G' > 0 and G" < 0. Z denotes other factors such as previous household investments, innate ability, and other school inputs that are exogenously determined. These inputs include quality of personnel, school infrastructure, and others that are determined by the government. I do not explicitly state those parameters in the functional form so as to make the presentation clear. I assume that institutional and information changes associated with the external transfers are neutral to voluntary contributions, that is, G M I = 0, where I denotes a measure of institutional and information inputs provided by the program. The utility of the household U is assumed to be a concave function of consumption C so that U' > 0 and U" < 0. Note that consumption is in this model a 8 {M } simplified representation of the opportunity cost for household investment. The household allocates resources to human capital and consumption so as to maximize utility. Note that with a binding budget restriction, consumption equals remaining resources after investment on education. Therefore, C = Y M . Let δ denote the subjective discount factor. Then the household problem is:
where Φ is a terminal value function that incorporates the benefits to the household of having educated children. These benefits can be consumption or pecuniary benefits related to education. The function Φ is assumed to be increasing in human capital at decreasing rates, so Φ' > 0 and Φ" < 0. Certainty of future outcomes is assumed.
Assuming uncertainty, the household maximization problem would be max The first-order condition for the solution to the problem described in equa-tion 1 implies that the marginal returns to lifetime utility through consumption must equal the marginal returns to lifetime utility through investment in human capital after the schooling period is over: For ease of exposition, assume that Φ(x) = x, then the cash transfer effect is:
Changes in Private Transfers to the School
And the matching effect is:
Equation 3 
Assuming that returns are decreasing for both capital formation and utility, then a non-monotonic effect of the program on M * across household income would imply that the sign of G" (1+nM * )+G' will change as school resources change. A simple way to see this is to assume that G" = 0. In this scenario, the effect of a program with both a matching grant and a cash grant would result in an increase in voluntary contributions for all income groups.
The Context and Programs

10
This section describes the role of voluntary contributions in public schools in Mexico and the two SBM programs on which model's implications are tested.
Voluntary Contributions
Public schools in Mexico are free by law, as provided in the Constitution. In practice, voluntary contributions made by parents provide the necessary resources to cover the most basic needs not covered by the government, which are usually associated with maintenance and operating costs. Over 90 percent of government expenditure in education goes to the payment of salaries, and the remaining amount is used for books and administrative costs (OECD, 2006) . Most schools are endowed with basic infrastructure, personnel, books, and utilities, such as water and electricity. In general, the principal and the parents meet annually and vote to set a voluntary contribution amount so that the school's basic expenses are covered. It is agreed before voting that all parents will commit to contribute the same amount to cover the school's expenses. 
PEC
This section describes the PEC program, its allocation rules, and previous evidence on its effects on student outcomes. PEC is the largest SBM program in Mexico. PEC additional demands on how parents should be involved. School allocation is made by a state-wide committee, which evaluates proposals and select schools to participate according to state criteria. According to Bracho and Martínez (2006) This study focuses on the evaluation of PEC for primary public schools which were eligible since the program started. Figure 1 shows school mobility by whether schools entered into the program, were already enrolled and continued receiving funds, dropped out of the program, or "graduated" because it stopped receiving funding after the fifth year. There have been two impact evaluations on PEC, by Skoufias and Shapiro (2006) and by Murnane and Cardenas (2006) . Skoufias and Shapiro (2006) Allowed expenditures exclude pay for unskilled labor, utilities, and construction of new classrooms. The program requires the parents' and student associations to be formalized.
Parents submit an improvement plan upon completion of training for this purpose.
The program was introduced in 125 telesecundarias in the state of Veracruz administered by the National Council for Educational Promotion (Consejo Nacional de
Fomento Educativo-CONAFE). CONAFE is a division of the Mexican Secretariat of
Education that serves rural communities with fewer than 30 children in a given level (preschool, primary, or secondary) in localities with fewer than 500 inhabitants. In most cases, a recent high school graduate is trained for six weeks to serve as a teacher and stays in the community. CONAFE provides materials to the students and teacher, and the community provides room and board for the teacher. Telesecundarias are secondary public schools that provide education through TV-based lessons and a teacher to lead them.
Telesecundarias are an especially interesting education modality because educational achievements are low when compared to other modalities and given the marginalized conditions of the communities; changes in provision tend to be costly. remained as controls to overcome the self-selection problem that was present in most previous evaluations.
There have been three evaluations of AGEs in Mexico, most of which focus on educational outcomes. In the most recent study (Gertler and Rodríguez-Oreggia, 2013 ), a randomized control trial was implemented in 250 CONAFE telesecundarias in the states of Chiapas, Guerrero, Puebla, and Yucatan. The authors find improvements of more than 0.20 standard deviations on student test scores and that training without cash transfers also leads to improvements. They also find that parental participation did not change significantly. A previous study by Gertler et al. (2008) uses panel information at the school level from 1998 to 2002 to estimate impact effects using difference in differences.
The authors find a positive impact on failure and repetition rates but no effect on dropout rates. Another study by Lopez-Calva and Espinosa (2006) 
Data
Since 1998 
Econometric Models and Estimation Methods
An ideal evaluation would compare outcomes when a given schools benefits from the program to the counterfactual. Since a given school is never observed in both states-that is, with and without the program-this study explores two identification strategies for each For example, public schools in wealthy areas may have a larger administrative capacity and therefore may be both more likely to apply to the program and differ in education outcomes. In this case, the correlation between wealth and education outcomes would be confounded with the effects of program participation.
Estimation of PEC Effects on Voluntary Contributions
The effect of the PEC program on voluntary contributions is identified by comparing the average across participating schools to non-participating schools. This difference is then compared to the differences that existed between participating and non-participating 
where  is an error term. After the introduction of school and state-year fixed effects, the main identifying assumption is that there are no unobservable time-varying school characteristics different from common trends across the state that determine both program participation and voluntary contributions. This assumption is tested using three years of data before the program was introduced. Bertrand et al. (2004) suggest allowing for an arbitrary auto-correlation process when computing the standard errors when the number of observations is large enough. Therefore, robust standard errors are clustered at the school level.
To test if the effects of PEC on voluntary contributions are different among poor and rich schools, schools are grouped in five groups according to the degree of marginality of the municipality where they are located. The differential effect across schools in different marginality categories is estimated with the following equation:
where DI denotes a dummy for each of five marginality groups I: very low, low, medium, high and very high marginality. The null for no difference of impact of program participation among schools in marginality group I when compared to the omitted group is H 0 : γ I = 0.
Estimation of AGEs' Effects on Voluntary Contributions
Random allocation to program participation creates two groups that are not different on average before program implementation. Table 1 
where t denotes time and s denotes a school, M st denotes voluntary contributions, DT denotes a dummy variable that indicates treatment, and D2 and D3 are dummy variables that indicate if the observation was made one or two years after the program was implemented.
5 Differences of 27 and p=0.108 in 2008 and -11 and p=0.516 for 2009.
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The identifying assumption for the estimation of the estimator is that the treatment group would have changed voluntary contributions in the same way as the control group if the program was not implemented, which is true under random assignment. 
Results
This section presents estimates of the impact of the PEC and AGEs programs on voluntary contributions made by parents to the school. The PEC section starts with tests of the underlying identification assumption, presents results, and finishes with robustness checks. The AGEs section presents results and robustness checks. The identification assumptions for AGEs are shown in Section 7.2.
PEC
Validity of the Underlying Assumptions for Identification
The main assumption behind identification of the impact of PEC on voluntary contributions is that the dynamics in schools that first participated in PEC are no ST ART is = µ s + αDM ARG is + βDU RB is + γ∆Y is + δ∆X is + is 
where ∆Y = Y 2000 Y 1999 is the pre intervention trend of the outcome, ∆X is the pre intervention trend of time-varying school observables, DM ARG is a dummy indicating whether the school is located in a locality with high or very high marginality, DU RB is a dummy indicating whether the school is located in an urban area, and µ s is a state fixed effect. (10) where DI is a dummy indicating whether the school is located in a locality with marginality level I (high, low, medium or very low marginality). Table 2 shows estimates of equations 9 and 10. The null hypothesis that changes in voluntary contribution do not predict program participation cannot be rejected either on average or by marginality groups. A second check is to test if average changes in voluntary contributions in schools that will enter PEC are different from those schools that will not enter and remain as counterfactuals for a given year.
No differences are found, and results are listed in Appendix A. Given no evidence of differences in trends before program participation, the main assumption is that these trends would have continued to have no differences in the following five years in the absence of the program. School controls include school size, percentage of indigenous students, percentage of students with special needs, percentage of students with foreign nationality, average teacher education, average education of principals, number of students per teacher, administrative personnel, percentage of teachers participating in the Carrera Magisterial teacher program. For column (3) it also controls for a dummy for the school located in a municipality with high or very high marginality. Source: Own calculations. * significant at 90%, ** significant at 95%, *** significant at 9 Estimation made with a linear specification with school and state-year fixed effects and t-statistics calculated with robust standard errors. P-values correspond to F tests for the addition of the coefficient for the omitted group and group effect different from zero. 
Estimates of the Effects of PEC on Voluntary Contributions
Robustness Checks
This section includes three robustness checks to the identification of PEC effects. First, estimates are checked taking into account the possible existence of omitted time-24 varying factors. Second, estimates are calculated taking into account possible different secular trends after program implementation. Third, the importance of selective migration is assessed to rule out program effects being driven by changes in school composition. The main results are robust to these checks.
Omitted Time-varying Factors
A threat to the validity of the estimates is the existence of omitted time-varying factors that do not occur in all schools in the state that determine both program participation and outcomes. The existence of time-varying factors omitted after introducing a state-year fixed effect and a school fixed effect are unlikely because policy making is done either at the federal or the state level.
One concern is that there may be some local time varying factors such as environmental conditions that affect program allocation and outcomes. Therefore, the effects of the program, including municipality-year fixed effects, are estimated. Table   4 shows that the estimates are not statistically different from the estimates with state-year fixed effects.
Another check is to conduct a placebo test by estimating the effects of the program on the year previous to school participation. No effects of PEC participation on voluntary contributions are found on the year before entry.
Appendix C shows estimates.
Differential Secular Trends
Another threat to the validity of the findings is that schools that benefit from PEC are 
Selective Migration
Another concern related to identifying program effects is that the best teachers or students could have moved to PEC. Student or teacher migration could result in changes in voluntary contributions not related to a direct change in parental allocation of resources in or outside the school. The strategy suggested by S. Galiani (2005) applied to the PEC panel shows that migration is less than 0.1 percent for both teachers and students. Appendix C includes estimation. Schools in localities with higher marginality may substitute in a way that is less consistent with the model. Note that the difference is not statistically significant, which may be a result of no effects or of the lack of power, given the sample size, to detect small differences. There is relatively little heterogeneity of school income as the 27 program focuses on CONAFE telesecundarias.
AGEs
Conclusions
Transferring decision making on school fund allocation to their constituents has been proposed as a way to improve the provision and quality of education. Previous studies show that school constituents will mediate the use of resources when they have 
Appendix B. Estimation of PEC Effects on Voluntary
Contributions by Quintiles Table 7 shows that voluntary contributions increase by $8.40 for the first quintile, 27 percent for the second quintile, 21 percent for the third quintile, 19 percent for the fourth quintile and 9 percent for the fifth quintile. Table 8 I test for identifying assumptions and make robustness checks analogous to those used for the marginality index and find that estimates for this specification are unlikely to be driven by unobservables. Table 9 shows that pre-intervention trends predict program participation for the lowest quintile. Pre-intervention trends and trends interacted with voluntary contributions in 1999 do not have predictive power on year of entry to the program. Another concern could be that the best teachers or students moved to PEC schools. In this case, the effects of PEC would be attributed to a change in student and/or teacher composition and not to the program itself. Teachers moving to PEC schools is unlikely. PEC does not allow direct benefits to teachers, like changes in salaries or labor conditions. Nor does PEC allow school decision makers to hire new personnel. Moreover, PEC benefits a school for up to five years. After five years, the school no longer has priority to receive benefits. Since the government and the union control the allocation of teachers, moving to a different school involves a time cost to the teachers to deal with bureaucracy.
Changes in student composition are more feasible. Therefore, it is informative to estimate both teacher and student migration. Estimation follows the methodology proposed by S. Galiani (2005) . This methodology proposes to check whether the 38 program affects the distribution of students in participating and non-participating schools. If there are no changes in relative enrollment rates, then changes in composition are unlikely. The unlikely scenario of strong and weak student mobility offsetting each other is possible. The estimation equation for the effect of the program on the share of students in a given school is the following:
Share ist = ν i + µ st + αY P EC ist + γX ist +  ist (12) where Share ist is the share of students in a municipality enrolled in school i.
The null hypothesis for no changes in student composition is H 0 : α = 0 39 Obs. 69700 69700 69700
State-year fixed effects. Standard robust errors clustered at the state level in parentheses.
School controls include school size, percentage of indigenous students, percentage of students with special needs, percentage of students with foreign nationality, average teacher education, average education of principals, student/teacher ratio, administrative personnel, and percentage of teachers participating in the Carrera Magisterial teacher program. * significant at 90%, ** significant at 95%, *** significant at 99%. Source: Own calculations.
To check for possible changes in teacher composition, equation 12 is estimated, replacing the dependent variable with the share of teachers in the municipality that work in the school. Results are shown in Table 10 . The effects of the program on migration are less than 0.01 percent. It is unlikely that the effect of the program is confounded with that of students or teachers migrating to PEC schools.
